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THE A1 TGL0-JAPANESE AL LIANCE OF 1902 
Causes Leading to Its Formation 
I 
THE B ACKGROUND O F TH E A LLIANCE 
Introduction 
The causes leading up to the formation 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should not be sought 
within the circle of events immediately surrounding 
the Agreement of 1902. The roots of alliance reach 
far back into the nineteenth century. An u nder­
standing of this Treaty requires a brief inquiry 
into British and Japanese Foreign policies previous 
to the actual adoption of the Agreement. 
After 1815, two fundamental factors en­
tered into British foreign policy v/hich were dis­
cernible throughout the remainder of the century. 
England had sought to maintain the Ottoman Empire 
against Russian Agression in the East.1  She was 
1. A. J.  Stapleton's Political Life of George 
Canning^ Vol. I l l ,  pp. 289-290. 
-2-
hostile to Prance during the entire period," not­
withstanding the apparent efforts of the two na­
tions to create friendly relations hy means of 
ententes and side-hy-side fighting--as in the case 
of the Greek and Turkish questions. 
After the fall  of Hapoleon, Great Brit­
ain entered upon a sort of isolation policy and 
endeavored to hold herself aloof from continental 
entanglements. Her fear of Russia in the Hear 
East,  however, prevented the success of this pol­
icy; neither was the period one of peace for Great 
Britain. Her fear of Russia had led to. the Cri-
2 
mean War in 1854, the Trent Affair had strained 
Anglo-American relations almost to the breaking 
3 point in 1861/ and the Pashoda Incident had almost 
1. E.Ashley: The-Life of H. J .  T. Viscount Pal-
merston. Vol. II.  pp. 25-56. 
2. The Annual Register,  1858, pp. 241-251. 
5. Senate Documents, 1861-62, 37th Gong. 2d Session, 
Vol. Il l .  Hos. 1-13, pp. 111-125. Ibid. Vol. IV, 
pp. 1-16. A splendid account of the affair is 
given in the Annual Register,  1861, pp. 288-319. 
resulted in war with France in 1898." Yet "while 
differences of opinion divided the country in re­
gard to particular steps the nation 
was at one in desiring to keep i ts hands unbound, 
to remain master of i ts fate, to pursue the even 
tenor of i ts way behind the rampart of the sea, to 
trust to i ts fleet '  for the security which contin­
ental powers sought in alliances and conscript 
o 
armies." This statement may not be accurate in 
every particular but there seems to be sufficient 
evidence to warrant the conclusion that her attempted 
isolation attained a considerable measure of suc­
cess in securing the interests of the British Em­
pire .  At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
however, new d angers to the interests of Great 
B l itain appeared upon the horizon and suggested 
the necessity of reconsidering her general l ine 
1. Sir Thomas Barclay: Thirty Years Anglo-French 
Reminiscences, pp. 145-46. 
2. G. P. Gooeh arid J .  H. B. Masterman: A C entury 
of British Foreign Policy, p. 45. 
of foreign policy "with a vi ew t o adjusting i t  to 
meet the needs of rising emergencies.~ 
The general principles of Japanese foreign 
policy since 1875 have been largely dominated by 
an imperialistic desire, which seems to be the re­
sult of economic necessity. Japan's policy of 
isolation is said to have begun in the year 1640. 
A Christian revolt in 1657 at Shimabara resulted 
in a great massacre at Hara, and by 1640 most all  
foreigners had been driven out of the country— 
except a few Chinese traders at Hagasiki and a few 
Dutch on the island of Deshima. Two ships were 
allowed to come annually to this island until  1790, 
when the number was reduced to one. Except for 
the small influence of these few Dutch traders, 
Japan remained sealed t.o W estern influences during 
1. The Parliamentary Debates; 1901, Vol. XC, pp. 
1652-54, Vol. XCVIII, pp. 247-49; 1902, Vol. 
CX, pi 942. 
2. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Ear 
East,  p. 105. 
-5-
the per aod from 1G40 to 1854 
The circumstances that induced the Uni­
ted States to compel Japan to abandon this policy 
of isolation in 1854 represented the outgrov/th 
of American commercial and industrial interests 
2 in the Pacific. The treaty with Great Britain 
3 in June 1846,"" and that with Mexico on 2 February 
4 1848," had opened up the Pacific Coast,  to the 
commerce of the United States, from the 49 parallel 
north latitude to the northern boundary of Lower 
California, a short distance south of the port of 
San Diego. The country had settled rapidly and 
commerce and industiy developed in a comparatively 
short time. The Americans had developed the whal­
X. The parliamentary Debates, 1854, Vol. CXXXIV, 
pp. 613-14. 
2. U. S .  Executive Documents, 1853-54, 33d Congress, 
1st Session, Vol. I .  pt .  I .  p. 6. 
3. For this treaty, see "Treaties and Conventions 
Between the United States and Other Powers/ 
1776-1887." pp. 438-39. 
4 .  I bid. p .  
-6-
ing industry in the Pacific and the wrecking of a 
ship now and then on the Japanese coast made i t  
necessary for the government of this country to 
obtain guarantees for the safety of her sailors.1  
In 1853 Commodore M. C. Perry was sent 
to Japan with instructions to negotiate a treaty 
with the ruler of that country which would guaran­
tee protection to shipwrecked American seamen, and 
permit American vessels to secure supplies in 
Japanese ports.2  On 3 1 March 1854, the Shogun 
signed a treaty with Commodore Perry which pro­
vided for friendship and amity, the opening of two 
ports for the purchase of supplies, the protection 
of shipwrecked sailors and for the stationing of 
consuls at Shimoda, should the circumstances re­
quire."5  This treaty marks the end of Japan's tv/o 
» 
1. U. S. Senate Documents, 18 54-55, 33d Congress, 
2d Session, Vol. VI, Ho. 34, pp. 9-l±. 
2. See Ibid, pp. 1-195 for the details of this Ex­
pedition. 
3. Por the text of the Treaty, see Senate Doc. 33d 
Cong., 2d Sess.,  Vol. VI, pp. 161-162. 
-7-
centuries of sullen seclusion. In June 1857, 
Townsend Harris,  who had been sent to Shimoda as 
Consul-General,  secured a commercial treaty, 7/hich 
was ratified one year later.1  This treaty threw 
open the port of Yokohama to American commerce ,  ̂  
and its provisions remained the basis of Japan*s 
commercial dealings with the outside world until  
1899, when her commercial treaties were revised 
and she took her place as a great power among the 
nations.3 
Japan*s policy of expansion may be said 
to have begun in 1874. Some inhabitants of the '  
Luchu Islands were shipwrecked on the Formosa 
coast and murdered by savages of the latter island. 
1. Senate Documents. 36th Cong. ,  1st Session.,  
Vol. IX, Ho. 25, pp. 1-15. 
2. Dor the treaty, see V/. M. UaHoy's "Treaties , 
and Conventions Between the United States and 
Other Powers, 1776-1909, pp. 998-1000. 
3. Por first revised commercial treaty, see "The 
Directory for China, Japan, Korea," etc.,  pp. 
173-178. 
-8-
A dispute arose between China and Japan. The lat­
ter,  claiming that the murdered Luchuans were her 
subjects, demanded an indemnity from the Chinese'  
Government. The matter was finally adjusted when, 
in 1874, China honored the Japanese demand and ad­
mitted that the Luchuans were Japanese subjects.1  
Two years later,  Japan took over the administra­
t ion of the Islands and in 1879, she incorporated 
them in her empire. Thus by 1874, Japan had begun 
to acquire an imperialistic mind. In 1875, a di s-
pute between Russia and Japan over the possession 
of the island of Sakhalin was terminated when R us­
sia agreed to recognize the Japanese claim to the 
Kurile group in exchange for Japanese relinquish­
ment of claim to the Sakhalin Island.^ Great Brit­
ain had honored the claims of Japan in 1861 to the 
Bonin Islands and fifteen years later,  Japan took 
1. G. H. Curzon: Problems of the Par East--Japan— 
Korea--Chins,,  p.  408 and Hote. 
2. The treaty for this arrangement appears in the 
"British and Poreign" State Papers." Vol. LXVI, 
pp. 218-23. See also, Asakawa, pp. 66-67. 
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them over as part of her empire. These acquisi­
tions were small and somewhat insignificant "but 
Japan was encouraged "by t hese minor successes, and 
she "began to look wistfully across the Strait to­
ward Korea. 
Japan's policy toward Korea and China 
grew out of economic necessity. Her trade and in­
dustry had greatly increased since the Harris Com­
mercial treaty; her agriculture could not support 
her increased population and she lacked raw ma­
terials for manufacturing; she needed new sources 
of supply end new f ields for colonizations. The 
conelusion would seem tenable that , should the mar­
kets of East Asia he closed, Japan's national l ife 
would he paralized, as her growing population would 
he largely deprived of i ts food and occupati on. 
These markets, then, must he left as open as the 
circumstances permit,  if  Japan would exist as a 
growing nation,*1  A v iolent protest against Japa­
1. Asakawa, pp. 8-11. 
-10-
nese immigration into Korea appeared in the 'Korea 
Daily ITews" iin 19 06, to -which the editor of the 
Yorodzu Ohoho replied in the folio-wing words: "We 
i 
humbly implore the Korea Daily Hev/s to teach us 
how to dispose of our surplus millions. Our l i t t le 
country can hardly find room within its narrow 
Boundary to accommodate half a million people who 
increase year after year. We cannot f ill  up the 
Sea of Japan to create dry land and settle them 
thereon. We would l ike to go to Kansas or anywhere 
except the lower world 7 /here we could escape star­
vation. But, however hospitable America may be, 
she refuses to receive so many incomers all  at once. 
We wouId very much l ike to cross over to Australia; 
but i t  is White Men's Australia, and although that 
continent is many times larger than Korea and is 
very thinly populated, no colored people are ad­
mitted there. We know Korea is densely populated, 
but there the least resistance is offered and so 
we go there, just as Englishmen went to America 
and Australia and elsewhere, forcing; the natives 
-11-
to make room for them In days of yore. But if  the 
Korea Daily Hew3 "w ill kindly use i ts powerful in­
fluence in our favor and persuade the Americans 
And Australians to receive any number of us, why, 
we should leave Korea alone and emigrate to those 
alnds of plenty with joy in our hearts."1  
"Commercially, too," says Mr. Brown, "The 
Japanese felt  that they needed Korea. As in EngLand, 
increasing population and inability to increase 
agriculture turned the national energies to manu­
facturing. Raw m aterials and markets, therefore, 
became questions of the first magnitude. Korea 
had both. . Japan wanted the open door in Korea; 
Russia would close i t .  This was vital,  for Japan 
depended largely on Korea for the additional food-
supplies that she needed."^ All the necessities 
1. An editorial for 25 September 1906, quoted in 
Brown* s "The Mastery of the Ear East." pp. 
150-51. 
2 ,  Ibid. p. 151. 
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mentioned in these quotations, however, constitute 
the elements that have combined to form the motives 
and forces behind the various policies of expansion 
during the nineteenth century; and they bear all  
the marks of imperialism. Thus as a result of such 
economic necessities, Japan had developed political 
interests in Korea.1  
Before 1834, the Korean Court had followed 
the custom of sending envoys to Japan upon the in-
augaration of a new S hogun; after that date, the 
practice 7/as abandoned and Korea never acknowledged 
any political connection with Japan, while she did 
"recognize China as her suzerain. After 1868, the 
Japanese tried several times to rene?/ their former 
relations with Korea, but they failed in this ef-
o 
fort .*" As early as 1873, Japanese statesmen began 
1. A. S. Hershey: The International La?/ a nd Di» 
plcmacy of the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 2-3. 
2. In 1876, Japan recognised the Independence of 
Korea out of fear of Russia. See De liartens: 
ITouveau R ecueil General de Trait en et outres 
Actes Relatifs aux Rapports de Droit Interna­
tional, Vol. I ll ,  pp. 511-16. 
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to fear the southward movement of Russia and i t  
"became an important part of Japanese policy to 
prevent Russia from absorbing Korea. It  was out 
of this fear of Russia that the ilea of conquering 
the peninsula was born,,1  This fact marks a well 
defined Russo-Japanese policy in China and Korea 
and the beginning of that rivalry which had grown 
so intensively by the time the Anglo-Japanese 
Treaty was made.2  But it  is necessary to leave 
general principles at this point and consider the 
main l ines of British and Japanese foreign policy 
which lad finally to the formation of the Alliance. 
The Boreign policy of Great Britain 
The international position of Great 
Britain at the outbreak of the Boer War was en-
tirely unsatisfactory, for by this time she had . 
1 .  Hornbeck, p. 198. 
2. Hayashi, pp. 80, 85, 91, 94, 103-107. 
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powerful rivals in Africa and the East--both Par 
and 1!ear.~ In Africa, the issue was between France 
and England and an amicable adjustment seemed im­
possible at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
During the entire period of the preceding century, 
both nations had commercial and political interests 
in Egypt.^ This country v/as considered the "Key 
to India" and Great Britain had secured the con­
troll ing interest in the Sues Canal for this rea­
son France had been offered the opportunity of 
becoming the dominant stockholder in this valuable 
commercial asset,  but fear of Germany had prevented 
4 
her, for the moment, and England took advantage 
of her delay and practically took over the Canal, 
which had been built  by French Capitalists.4  
1. Barclay, pp. 150, 161, 167, 168. 
Curzon, pp. 178, 208-15. 
2. liUrray* s Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, p. 52. 
3. Barclay, pp. 37, 52. 
4. Ibid. pp. 243. 
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prance was jealous of the advantage thus gained hy 
Great Britain and felt  that the latter had intrigued 
to come into possession of what 7 /as hy rights her 
very own. Prance had been the preponderant power 
in Egypt since the days of Napoleon I ,  and the 
whole territory had once almost belonged to her. 
Moreover, her protectorate over Algeria caused 
Prance to view any movement in Northern Africa, 
on the part of Great Britain, with deep concern. 
Pinally, Prance 7/as forced to recognize the peculiar 
interests of England in Egypt and the Sudan, but 
all  through the process she was increasingly ir­
ritated by Great Britain and the rivalry continued 
to grow.-" 
This mutual hostili ty between England 
and Prance was of long standing and the two coun­
tries had been on the verge of v/ar many times. The 
entente of Lord Aberdeen and M. Guizot, during the 
1. Murray, p. 53. 
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rei gn of Louis Philippe, had been smashed by the 
Spanish marriages;  ̂  the comradeship of ilapoleon 
III,  in the Crimean War was viewed with suspicion 
by the British as was his 7/ar policy against Ger-
p 
many in 1870;"" the Jules perry program of colonial 
expansion in 1881, had opened new a nd boundless 
fields of controversy.In 1893, the Siamese in­
cident almost brought the two nati ens to blows,^ 
and in 1898, v/hen Major Marc hand was forced to re­
t ire from Pashoda,0  was seemed inevitable. The 
problems 7/ere so many and so thorny between the 
t7/o traditional enemies that the sword appeared 
to oe the only means that could guarantee a success­
1. Bulwer's Life of palmerston, Vol. I ll ,  pp. 208-
33. 
2. Ashley1  s Life of Palmerston,,  Vol. II,  pp. 187-
98 .  
3. Barclay',  pp. 82, 85, 89. 
4'.  Ibid, pp« 106-10. Parliamentary Debates, 1893, 
Vol. 'XII, 903, 1748-1749. 
5. Barclay, pp. 144-56. 
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ful settlement. Sir Edmund Monson, in his Paris 
speech of 6 December 1B98, protested against th& 
policy of "pin-pricks" and insisted that i t  would 
be of vast importance to both nations to bring 
such a policy to a speedy termination;"1 '  but Franco-
British colonial antagonism and national hatred 
was intensified on every hand, and not until  1903, 
when a treaty of arbitration--the work of Sir 
Thomas Barclay and Baron d'Estournelles—which pro­
vided for the adjustment of judicial disputes be­
fore the Hague Tribunal, was agreed upon, was there 
any sign of a cessation.of these mutual hostili­
ties.2  Thus at the beginning of the twentieth cen­
tury, the relations between England and France 
were strained to the limit and there was l i t t le 
apparent possibility of a reconciliation.^ 
1. Barclay, pp. 157-158. 
2. Ibid. pp. 217-36. 
3. Seymour 's  Diplomatic Background of the War, 
p.  122. 
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Th e relations between Great Britain and 
Russia—which occupy a significant place in the 
Background of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 
- - 7 /ere as "badly strained as those betv/een England 
and France. This hostility, too, was a traditional 
one, dating even further back than the Congress 
of Vienna. England had prevented Russia from ob­
taining an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea, she 
had opposed Russia in Persia and Afghanistan; and 
the interests of these two powers had again clashed 
in the Ear East.  Great Britain feared for the 
security of her possessions in India. Since the 
days of Catherine II and the treaty of Kutchuk-
Kainardjl,1  Rusia had looked toward Constantinople 
with the hope that,  some day, i t  would be a Rus­
sian port from which she would be able to move on 
to India and the Ear East.2  ITapoleon and Czar 
1.  The Annual Register,  1774, Vol. XVII, pp. 7-10 .. 
W. Miller 's Ottoman Empire, p -  8. 
2. Baron Worm's English policy in the East.  pp. 6-7. 
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Alexander, at Tilsit  in 1807, had planned the par­
tit ion of the Ottoman Empire,1  "but the question 
as to which, one should have Constantinople seems 
to have caused a rupture; and Napoleon's attempt 
to invade Russia five years later checked the 
latter power's advance in the Near East,  for the 
moment; hut after the overthrow of Napoleon, 
Russia's hands were loosed so that she could re­
sume h er aggressive policy. Russian desire in 
this direction was not only comprehensive hut 
it-was persistent throughout the nineteenth cen­
tury; and that England feared for her Indian pos­
sessions as evident from the following statement, 
made hy James KacGhan--a well informed writer of 
the period--in 1876: "The Russians are steadily 
advancing toward India, and they will ,  sooner or 
later,  acquire a. p osition in central Asia, which 
will enable them to threaten i t .  Should England 
1. Oakes and howat: C-reat European Treaties, 
pp. 164-72. 
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"be engage 1 in a European War, then, indeed, Rus­
sia will probably strike a "blow a t England's In­
dian power." J* 
The action taken "by Great Britain in 
the War of Greek Independence in 1827, is among 
the notable events which mark the many attempts 
which she made to foil the imperialistic policy 
of Russia in the Hear East.2  George Canning was 
quite willing to cooperate with Liberals if  i t  
meant anything to British economic interests ,3 
His policy of non-intervention, however, meant 
nothing, when he became convinced that Turkish 
iorocities must be checked. Bearing that Russia, 
if  left to act alone, 7/ould exploit the defeated 
Turk,4  he seized the opportunity to bring about 
1. A. Rambaud: The Case of Russia, p. 87. 
2. Seymour, p. 123. 
3. Hayes'  "political and Social History of Europe." 
Vol. II .  pp. 37-47. 
4. Stapleton, Vol. Ill ,  pp. 252—55. 
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concetrt ed action of the po?/ers .  This resulted in 
the treaty of Londoiv-signed 6 July 1827--oy 7/hich 
England, france and Russia agreed to make a joint 
demand for a settlement of the Greek question.-1-
In 1833, Russia had signed with Turkey 
a treaty of mutual alliance and assistance--the 
treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi—"by ir/hi ch i t  was st ip­
ulated, in a secret clause, that,  if  the need 
7/ere that of Russia, the Sultan should close the 
O 
Dardanelles to the warships of all  nations^--"but 
permitting free egress to the Russian fleet .  
This treaty was abrogated in 1841--due largely to 
the efforts of Great Britain--and the new " Treaty 
of the Straits" was substituted, by which the 
Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were to be closed 
1. Stapleton . Vol. I l l ,  p. 286. for the treaty, 
See" Hertslet '  s "Map of Europe by Treaty," Vol. 
I .  II o .  136, pp. 7 69 -  74 .  
2. Oakes and Ilownt, pp. 166-67. For the Treaty, 
* See Hertslet 's "Europe by Treaty," Vol. II,  
Ho. 168, p*o .  925-2U. 
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to the War.ships of all  ne.tions so long as the port 
should remain at peace." This 77as a great disap­
pointment to Russia and i t  greatly intensified the 
hostilit ies of the t?/o rivals. 
The Crimean Y/ar of 1854 7/as another 
attempt on the part of Great Britain to check 
o 
Russian aggression in the hear East." It  v;as for 
this same reason that Disraeli Y/orked so hard to 
"bring about the Treaty of B er l i n ,  3 ?/hi ch forced 
upon Russia the revision of the San Stefano Trea­
ty/* Russia thus checked in this quarter, turned 
to the Central East with the hope of gaining con­
trol of Persia and through the Persian Gulf, an 
outlet to the Indian Ocean. This would give her 
an ice-free port and might enable her ultimately 
1. Oakes and llowat, pp. 166-67. For the Treaty , 
See Hertslet,  Vol. II,  Ho. 193, pp..  1 025-26. 
2. Ashley's,  Life of Palmerston, Vol. II ,  pp. 25-26. 
3. Hertslet ,  Vol. IV, Ho. 530, pp. 2759-99. 
4. Oakes and Mowat, pp. 877-90. 
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to seize India. She had already taken possession 
of Bokhara and established herself upon the bor­
ders of Afghanistan;^ should she get control of 
this country, i t  would be possible to overrun 
India some day. But Great Britain again stepped 
in and called a halt by sending Lord Roberts with 
an army into Afghanistan,^* And, although this 
campaign was not a success, i t  served to increase 
the hostilit ies between the two nations. 
In the Far East,  Russia had attempted 
a policy of expansion at the expense of China. 
In 1860, she had acquired the maritime province 
7/here Vladivostok was established, and she thought 
i t  possible to move on from this region to Man­
churia, Port Arthur, and Korea.0  But by the trea­
1. Lord Roberta Forty-one Years in India, p. 340. 
2. A. Rambaud: "Hist oire de la Russi e," pp. 701-
708 .  




ty of Nanking—signed witli  China in 1842 —Great 
Britain, too , had acquired important interests 
in the Far East , and these commercial interests 
had grown very rapidly. After England's activities 
in this quarter, other powers followed, but Great 
Britain always remained predominant and she con­
sidered it  necessary to hoid this position of 
strength* British interests had continued to 
grow as may be seen by the follov/ing statement 
made by Lord Cranborne in 1902: "We own sixty 
per cent of all  the shipping which trades with 
China; ?/e own about one half of all  the commerce 
whi ch goes to and comes from China; so that our 
commercial position is one of very great impor­
tance Thus Russian aggression constituted a 
very grave source of danger to the commercial in­
terests of Great Britain "in the Far East; and by 
1902, "the rivalry was such in this quarter as to 
1. For the treaty, see "The Directory and Chronicle 
for China, Japan, Korea," etc.,  pp. 3-5. 
2. The Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CII, p. 1284. 
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1 make eminent the danger of open conf11ct•" 
England1s relations with Germany at the 
time the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was formed were 
considerably different from those with other 
powers, and yet there 7 /as to be found the roots 
of that rivalry which later developed into the 
World War. Germany was a young state and her 
statesmen had not been generally hostile to Great 
Britain. Bismarck, until  his dismissal—8 March 
1890—had maintained unquestionable official rela­
tions with England; and the cession of Heligoland 
o 
to Germany in 1890" indicates the confidence that 
Lord Salisbury had in the permanency of cordial 
relations between the two nations..  Mr. Seymour 
credits Bismarck with the foilo?/ing statement: 
"As regards England, we are in the happy situation 
of having no conflict,  of interests, except com­
mercial rivalry and passing differences such as 
1. Seymour, p. 125. 
2. The Agreement appears in The British Eoreign 
and State papers, 1889-90. "Vol. LXXXII, p.  46. 
Also in Hertslet1  s Complete Collection,.  Vol. 
XVIII ,  pp. 455-61. 
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must always arise; "but there is nothing that can 
"bring a "bout a r/ar "between two pacific and hard­
working nations."1  But the Kaiser's telegram of 
congratulation--3 January 1396—to President 
2 Kruger on his repulse of the "Jameson Raid"" was 
a source of considerable popular bit terness in 
England; but, as no further developments followed, 
the incident was considered to be merely a personal 
act of an excitable ruler; and, at the outbreak of 
the Boer Yfar ,  Anglo-German relations appeared to 
be satisfactory. 
In October 1901, the German tried to 
form an all iance of mutual defense with Great 
Britain that would guarantee the possessions of 
these tv;o powers on every continent except Asia 
--this exception being made to avoid a Russo-Ger-
man collision. Great Britain refused the proposal 
1. Seymour, p.  134, Note--A Citation from d'Avril:  
Negotiations relatives au Traites de Berlin. 
325. 
2. The London Times, 4 January, 1396, p. 5. 
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--fearing a further estrangement of France—and. 
the Anglo-German official intimacy began a rapid 
decline so that by the end of the Boer Y/ar in 
1902, the rivalry between these two nations was 
making good headway; and German activities in the 
Far East were coming to have a direct bearing upon 
o the situation. 
The Foreign pollcy of Japan 
In summing up the main lines of Japanese 
foreign policy, i t  is only necessary to touch upon 
the relations that existed between Japan on the 
one hand, and Korea, China, and Russia on the 
other, during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. In the general principles of Japan's 
foreign policy as indicated above, i t  v/as shown 
1. V. Chirol in The Quarterly Review, October, 
1914, pp. 415-449. 
2.  See W. W. Rockhill 's "Treaties and Conventions," 
ITo. 1 4, p. 62. Blue Book, China, Ho. 5 (1900}, 
pp. 1-8. 
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that her minor successes until  1876 had created a 
Japanese imperialistic mind, end that Japanese 
interests in Korea and China were not only eco­
nomic but political as well.  In 1875, a Japanese 
gunboat had been fired upon at the mouth of the 
Han River by a Korean fort;  the Japanese warriors 
landed and practically annihilated the fort;  and 
on 26 February 1876, the Korean Court was forced 
to sign a treaty which marks the beginning of 
Korea's subjection to Japan,.1- This treaty pro­
vided for the opening of three Korean ports and the 
immediate establishment of commercial relations 
p 
between the-two countries. This treaty is called 
one of "peace and amity," but i t  would seem that 
the peace depended largely upon the development of 
Japan's economic interests in Korea, In 1880, 
Japanese traders went to the open ports provided 
by the treaty and a Japanese minister was sent to 
1. Hornbeck, p. 199. 
2. Henry Chung's "Korean Treaties," pp. 205-12. 
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Seoul. Representatives of the United States and 
Great Britain were sent there also within the next 
two years as if Japan had really made Korea an 
independent empire. But Japan's aggressive atti­
tude toward Korea only continued the jealousy and 
suspicion of China, and Li Hung Chang persuaded 
Korea to open relations with the western powers,1  
which resulted in the formation of a series of 
treaties from 1882 to 1886.^ 
Both China and Japan desired to control 
Korea and two factions arose in the Korean Court--
one progressive, the other conservative—and in­
terna- strife followed. The progressives appealed 
to Japan for assistance while the conservatives 
looked to China to settle their difficulties. 
Both the rival nations sent troops to Korea, hut 
in 1885, a convention, signed at Tientsin, provided 
1. Hornhec a, p. 200. 
2. These treaties appear in Chung's "Korean Trea­




f or a joint withdrawal of their respective troops • 
Strife, bloodshed and intrigue, however, continued 
for the next ten years and,, in 1894, in consequence 
of another insurrection, Chinese and Japanese 
troops once more iound themselves face to face in 
o 
K o r e a . J a p a n  d e t e r m i n e d  t o  s o l v e  t h e  K o r ea n  q u e s ­
tions "by introducing reforms into Korea, while 
China, reasserting her ancient claim to suzerainty 
over Korea, strongly protested against the Japa­
nese plan. These peculiar activities constitute 
conclusive evidence that neither of the tv/o nations 
meant to follov; the provisions of the Tientsin 
Convention. Both China and Japan seem to have de­
tected the treachery of each other in regard to 
this treaty and war soon followed, in which China 
7/as ignominiously defeated on "both land and sea. 
1. curzon, p. 193. For the treaty, see the British 
and Foreign State papers. Vol. LXXVI, pp. 297-
98. 
2. Hay as hi , (Introduct ion) pp. 37-60. 
Hornbech, p. 203. 
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The Japanese had actually invaded North China and 
were ready to advance upon pehing 7/hen the Chinese 
Government sued for peace. The treaty of Shimono-
seki,-L  signed 17 April 1895, closed this war. By 
this treaty China was forced to cede 1 1  the southern 
portion of the province of Feng-t ' ien;" "The island 
of Formosa, together with all  islands appertaining 
to the said isi nd of Formosa;" "the Pescadores 
Group." In addition to the cession of these val­
uable territories China was forced to "agree to 
pay to Japan as a war indemnity the sum of t?/o 
hundred million Kuping taels Other provisions 
were made which were far-reaching in their demor-
o 
alizing effect upon China; "The inhabitants of 
1. For the treaty, see the U. S. House Documents, 
54th Congress, 1st Session, Yol. I .  pp. 200-203. 
2. It  is interesting to compare the Japanese de­
mands in this treaty wi th the clause in the 
preamble of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which 
says: "Being moreover speci ally interested in 
maintaining the independence and territori aL 
integrity of the Empire of China and the Em­
pire of Korea." 
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the territories ceded to Japan, who wish to take 
up their residence outside the ceded districts,  
shall be at l iberty to sell their real property 
and retire.China was forced to open a number 
of towns, cities and ports to the Japanese on 
such terms as would give the latter the dominating 
2 influence in these towns and ports." One of the 
mo st striking demands of this treaty is to be 
found in the first part of Article VI, which reads 
as follows: "All treaties betv/een Japan and China 
having came to an end in consequence of war, China 
engages immediately upon the exchange of the 
ratifications of this act- -  - - -  -until  the said 
treaty and conventions are brought into actual 
operation, to accord the Japanese Government, i ts 
officials,  commerce, navigations, frontier inter­
1. This clause must have been meant to clear the 
territories of the Chinese inhabitants so the 
Japanese moving in would "find room." 
2. This part of Article VI. of the treaty seems 
familiar to the American, when compared with 
the Japanese demands on the California coast.  
33-
course , and trade, industries, ships, and subjects 
in every respect- -  -  - -most favoured-nation 
treatment."1 China was compelled also to withdraw 
and renounce her f onner claim to suzerainty over 
Korea and to recognize "definitely the full and 
complete independence and autonomy of Korea." 
This treaty gave great offence to Russia and, to­
gether with France and Germany, she "counselled" 
2 Japan to withdraw from the mainland of China." 
Japan 7 /as allowed to keep the remainder of the 
spoils 'with an additional indemnity of thirty 
million taelr 3  and, notwithstanding her losses 
sustained by the revision of the treaty, she had 
1. The demands of Japan upon China in this treaty 
constitute perhaps, the most sweeping and un­
reasonable price which the latter has ever paid 
for peace. This treaty is thus thoroughly sig­
nificant of Japan's growing policy of imperial­
ism and her determination to expand at the ex­
pense of neighbouring countries. 
2. Hayashi, pp. 79-84 .  
3. Rockhi 11, Ho. 4, p. 26. British Foreign and 
State Papers, Vol. LXXXVII, pp. 1195-97. 
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added valuable territories to her Empire and had 
been placed in a position to carry out her designs 
on Korea. 
But the revision of the Shimonoseki Trea­
ty marks the beginning of a we11 defined Russo-
Japanese conflict,  for, from this event, Japanese 
hatred of Russia became so intense that i t  pro­
mised important developments for tne future."*" I t  
was this hatred for Russia--caused by her leader­
ship in forcing Japan to surrender her gains from 
China—that led Japan to increase her military 
strength and prestige. "It  became to her as clear 
as daylight that the new position she had acquired 
in the Orient by her victory over China could be 
maintained, and even her independence must be 
guarded., only by an armament powerful enough bo 
give her a voice among the first 'powers of the 
world."2  The feeling of the Japanese people after 
1. Hayashi, pp. 77-79 .  
2. Asalcawa, p.  79. See also, p. 80. 
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the revision of the Shimonoseid Treaty, was well 
expressed "by C ount Hayashi when h e said: "The 
treaty and i ts amendments "by no means ends matters; "~L  
and, since Russia v/as so "bent on the revision of the 
treaty--"going even so far as to prepare the army 
contingents in the Amur region for quick mohiliza-
tion"^--she brought upon herself all  this hatred, 
which now entered into Japanese foreign policy to 
play an important part in bringing about the in­
evitable that followed in 1904--as well as the 
3 Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902." Prom the date 
of this treaty revision it  became clear to Japan 
that her own existence depended upon her ability 
to compete with the great nations. "If she would 
not retire into herself,  and finally cease to exist,  
she must compete with the greatest nations, not 
1. Hayashi , p.  109. (Quoted from the Jiji  Shimpo, 
a Japanese Magazine, for June and July, 1895). 
2. Asakawa, p. 75. 
3. Hayashi, pp. 77-80. 
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only in the arts of peace, hut also in those of 
war. Moreover a far vaster conflict than she had 
ever knov/n in her history, excepting the Mongol in 
vasion of the thirteenth centupy, v/as seen to he 
awaiting her. The only course to save her seemed 
to he- -  -  -  -to go forward and become equal to 
the n ev i ,  expanding situation."-1  Consequently the 
budgets of the Japanese government show a great 
increase in army and navy expenditures from this 
time on.^ 
The increased activities of Russia in 
i 
China also constituted a source of great alarm to 
the Japanese Government. In 1891, Russia had he-
gun her railY/ay projects in Siberia, v/hich--after 
squeezing many concessions from China0--she devel­
1. Asakav/a, pp. 79-80. 
2. Ibid. See the table on p. 80. 
3. The London Times , 20 March 19ul. Rockhill  xio. 
41, p. 309. Blue Book, China, ho. 1 (1898) 
H o .  1 4 ,  p p .  5 - 6 .  
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oped into her Siberian SystemShe had granted 
2 Omna a great loan after the Chine-Japanese war; 
she had established the Ku sso-Chinese Bank in 
1895;^ and by the end of the year 1896, Russia 
had gained many valuable concessions and privileges 
from China. On 30 September ±896 ,  the famous 
Cassini Convention was ratified at Peking^--the 
existence of which has been denied by the Russian 
5 Government. This treaty is reputed to have been 
concluded earlier in the same year for i t  7/as 
published in the "North China Daily hews" on 27 
6 March. O f  this treaty, no Russian text has ever 
been published, Out Dr. Asakawa has given an 
1. Asakawa, pp. 97-99. 
2. coriier,  Vol. Il l ,  pp. 205-208. 
3. Ibid, III,  311-312. Rocldiill ,  No. 31. 
Asaka?/a, p.  84. 
4 .  Asakav/a ,  p .  88 .  
5 .  I b i d . ,  p p  .  85  a n d  9 0 .  
6 .  I b i d . ,  p .  8 5 .  
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abstract frcsn a Japanese source "which, coincides 
with the French and English texts which are now 
extant.1  The provisions of the treaty gave Russia 
great advantages in regard to the use of Chinese 
ports. China also promised to-assist Russia in 
case of war, and made great railv/ay concessions— 
it  would seem that such an all iance couxd have 
been aimed only at Japan. In September 1896, an­
other agreement, which made important railroad 
concessions to Russia was signed bet?/een Chinese 
Government and the Russo-Chinese bank." The road 
to Vladivostok, through lianchuri a, and the Chinese 
Eastern Railway was begun in August 1897, according 
% 
to the above agreement. 
1.  Asakawa, pp. 85-90. There is a French text,  
translated from "The Forth China Herald in 
Cordier, vol.  I ll ,  pp. 343-48. An E nglish text 
appears in Beveridge's "The Russian Advance," 
pp. 469-73. Also in Weale's "Re-shaping the 
Far East/ '  Vol. II ,  pp. 439-44. 
2. See Rockhill ,  Fo .  32, pp. 212-14. Also Weale5  s 
"Re-shaping the Far East," Vol. II ,  pp. 444-54. 
3 .  Asakawa, p. 99 .  
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Russia, however, was st ill  longing for 
an ice-free port,  and following the example of 
Germany--the latter had secured a ninety-nine-year 
lease on the bay and port of Kiao-chow, together 
with important mining and railroad privileges in 
the Shan-tung provinces-she felt  justified in 
making a similar seizure; and consequently, she 
demanded and obtained a lease of Port Arthur and 
Tali en-wan, as well as important rail?/ay conces­
s i o ns ^  ^he agreement by 'which Russia secured 
this lease was consummated on 27 March 1893, and 
on 3 April following. Great Britain secured a 
promise of the lease of Wei -hai-7/ei—but the agree-
3 inent was not signed until  1 July. Japan approved 
this lease -which 7/as to remain in the hands of the 
1. Cordier, Vol. Il l ,  pp. 352-61. Rockhill ,  ho. 8, 
pp .  45-49 * 
2 .Blue Book, China, ho. 2, (1899 j,  Eos. 134, 136, 
137. Rockhill ,  ho. 9, pp. 50-52. 
3. China, Treaty Series no. 14 (1898). China ho. 
1, (1899), pp. 80-81, 199. 
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British as Bang as Russia should retain Port 
Arthur1*— the latter had "been l eased for a term of 
twenty-five years^--and "speedily evacuated the 
port in favor of England, leaving "behind them 
every accommodation to the successor." ' '  Port 
Arthur and Dalny constituted a part of the spoils 
that Russia had been so energetic in forcing Japan 
to return to China in 1895; i t  was, therefore, of 
vital importance to Japan to have a friend near 
byespecially so, if  that friend should oe a foe 
to Russia. England's fear and enmity tov/ard 
Russia are clearly shown by her activities against 
Russia's penetration into Persia, her arrival upon 
the borders of Afghanistan, her program of rail­
road extension toward the Afghan Frontier and her 
1. The Text appears in Treaty series do .  14 above. 
China (1899), p. 109. 
2. See U. S. House Documents (Foreign Relations, 
1898), 55th Congress, 3d Session, V o j  .  I ,  Do .  
I ,  pp. 182-191. 
3. Asakawa, p. 129. 
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intrigues in Tibet.  All these events gave Great 
Britain just cause for alarm, and this fear of 
Russia was not allayed unti 1 the formation of the 
Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. When S ir Claude 
HacDonald reported to the British Government that 
M. Pavloff 7/as pressing the Chinese Government 
for the lease of Port Arthur and Tali en-wan and 
a railway concession that would connect Russia1  s 
railroad system with these ports, i t  "made a pro­
found impression upon the British Government, 
-which- -  -  -  -was compelled to say that,  if the 
Russian demands were granted, 'her influence over 
the Government of Peking would "be s o increased, to 
the detriment of that of Her Majesty's Government, 
that i t  seemed desiraole for them to make some 
countermove. The best plan would perhaps be, on 
the cession of Wei-hai-wei by the Japanese- -  -  -
to insist on the refusal of a lease of that port 
on terms similar to those granted to Germany. " , x  
1. See Asakawra, pp. 120-21. The enclosed quotation 
is from China, Ho. 1 (1898), Ho. 95--Salisbury 
to MacDonald. 
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That Japan expected war with Russia is very evi­
dent from the following quotation from the same 
author: "It  was no matter of surprise to Japan 
that Russia no7/ s ecured for herself the most 
strategic portion of the territory, the retention 
of v/hich "by Japan was, three years ago, declared 
"by the same power to be imperiling the position 
of Peking, rendering Korean independence nominal, 
and interfering with the permanent peace of the Par 
East.  "When i t  was announced by Russia, in Decem­
ber last,  that Port Arthur had been lent to her 
by China only temporarily as a y/ inter anchorage, 
the Japanese Government merely 'credited this 
assurance, and accordingly took note of i t . '  When 
the negotiations for the lease were in progress, 
the Japanese Government made no protest,  and Y/hen 
they were consummated, i t  manifested no appreciable 
sentiment. At the same time, i t  quietly approved 
of the British lease of Wei-hai - y/ei,  y/hich the 
Japanese tr  oops had still  held pending the final 
payment of the Chinese indemnity. Then they 
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speedily evacuated the port in favor of England, 
leaving "behi rd them every accommodation to the 
successor .n~ This quotation, however, may be 
considered as putting the Japanese opinion in a 
mild form when placed "beside the words of Count 
Tadasu Hayashi. He says: 
"Our countrymen must "be warned that the 
treaty of Shimonoselci and i ts amendments "by no 
means ends matters. We must he prepared for many 
years to come to carry on both warlike and peace 
ful measures for the assertion of our rights. We 
must not shrink from attacking both to the North 
and the South with that object in view. 
"As to the permanent occupation of Port 
Arthur, that part of Fengtien, which the second 
article of the treaty of Shimunoseki gave us, we 
have had to surrender i t .  The Russian, French 
and German Governments- -  -  - -advised our Govern-
1. Asalcawa, pp. 128-29. The enclosed quotation is 
from the British parliamentary papers, China 
No. 1, (1898), No. 29. 
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ment to hand i t  back to China, and- -  -  -  -we de­
cided to accept that advice- -----.  
"It is naturally very unpleasant to re­
linquish something 7 /hich has once been in our 
possession, and though we did this as the result 
of the friendly advice of the powers, i t  seems an 
insupportable hardship that what we have once 
gained should be so 1 ost.  
"Opinions may differ in connexion with 
this matter,  but- -  -  - -the ways of international 
intercourse amongst the so-called civilized na­
tions are inconceivably intricate- -  -
"It must never be forgotten that discon­
tent is trie prime factor which incites men to 
greater activity and dil igence. We should there­
fore retain our discontent to spur us on to greater 
diligence, with a view to one day dispersing the 
gloom around us. We m ust persistently suffer the 
insufferable and support the insupportable for the 
sake of what the future will have in store for us. 
In thi s way we shall truly promote the strength 
and prosperity of our nation. 
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"We should exert ourselves to develop 
our commerce and industries, for these are the 
principal factors of national expansion- -  - - -
7 /e must also devote more attention than ever to 
building up on scientific principles our army and 
navy. 
"We must continue to study according to 
Western methods, for the application of science 
is the most important item of 7/arlike preparations 
that civilized nations regard. If ner/ ships of 
7/ar are consi iered necessary, we m ust build them at 
any cost.  If the organization of our army is 
found to be wrong, i t  nrust at once be renovated. 
If advisable our 7/hole military system must be 
entirely changed. We must build docks to be able 
to repair our ships. We must establish a steel 
factory to supply guns and ammunition. Our rail­
ways must be extended so that 7/e c an mobilize our 
troops rapidly. Our oversea shipping must d o  de­
veloped so that 7/e can provide transports to carry 
our armies abroad. 
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"Tliis is the programme that .7/e have to 
keep always in view- -  -  - -Whilst our prepara­
tions are in the making things will not "be easy 
-  _ -  - -But if  v/e alY/ays keep in vie?/ the great 
ends which I have indicated, then 7/e shall endure 
all  these things gladly. 
"Peace has "been restored "but i t  cannot 
"be a lasting peace. We must sacrifice ourselves, 
v/e must y / ork for thos:e y/ho come after us- -  -  -  -
Many will "be disappointed and discontented, but 
they must endure all  their disappointment and dis­
content in silence and v/ith a brave heart.  
"It  is not the first time in History that 
a power which has been strategically successful 
has been beaten in the Council Chamber. Russia 
beat Turkey, but England cancelled her victory and 
she returned home emptyhanded, leaving behind the 
mountain of treasure for v/hich she had fought- -
"No mo dern war except the Franco-Prussian 
War has been concluded without interference from 
some outside pov/er- -  -  -  -No power is to be 
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blamed if i t  takes advantage of the v/eakness of '  
another and can gain advantage for itself there­
by- -  -  ~ 
"V/hat Japan has no?/ to do is to keep 
perfectly quiet ,  and to wait,  meanwhile strength­
ening the foundations of her national po?/er, 
7/atching and waiting for the opportunity which 
must one day surely come in the Orient. Y/hen t hat 
day arrives she will "be a ble to follow her own 
course, not only able to put meddling powers in 
their places, "but even, as necessity arises, med­
dling with the affairs of other powers. Then 
truly she will "be able to reap advantages for her­
self."1  
Thus if  Count Hayashi--to whose earnest 
efforts the negotiation of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance has "been credited—is to be taken as 
authority, there can be no doubt as to the deter­
1. Hayashi, pp. 109-113--A reprint f t  ma  th e Jiji  
Shimpo, a Japanese Periodical,  for June and 
July 1895. 
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mination of Japan to meet Russia on the field of 
"battle at the earliest possible date. IT or can 
there "be a ny doubt as to Japan's determined pol­
icy for "taking advantage of the weakness of another 
nation to gain advantage for herself thereby." 
During the Boxer uprising, Russia had 
actually seized Chinese territory along the Amur, 
and had placed the treaty port of Hiu-chwang under 
the civil administrati  on of Russian authorities. 
To allay the apprehensions of the other powers, 
she informed them by circular notes that her ac­
tion was only temporary, and that she would with­
draw her troops as soon as she considered her in­
terests secure.1  She did not do this,  hov/ever, 
but proceeded to formulate the"Alexieff-Tseng" 
Agreement,-4 ,  by which she further stipulated the 
conditions upon which China should resume the civil 
1. Blue Book, C nina, Ho. 2 (1904), Ho s .  91, 92. 
Also see U.S. House Doc. (For. Rel .  1900), pp 
304, 372, 380. 
2. The London Times, 3 January, 1901. 
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government of Sheng-ki ng. Tiie contents of the 
agreement caused considerable commotion among the 
other powers, and the United States, Germany, 
Japan and Great Britain made strong protests to 
China;! but Russia again declared that she only 
meant to secure her interests in the occupied 
territory.In February 1901, however, Russia 
urged upon China another agreement--the "Lamsdorf f-
Yang-YuH  Convent ion0--the terms of which appear to 
have been very unreasonable. But protests from 
Japan and Great Britain caused the abandonment of 
the negotiations.4  Russia was not yet satisfied 
and she made new demands upon China, which were 
disclosed to the American Ambassador at Peking, 
on 11 December 1 901.5  She also proposed another 
1. China, Ho. 2 (1904),,  Hos .  8, 12, 13, 14, 19. 
2. Ibid., ,  Bo. 2 (1901), pp. 1-3. Ho. 2 (1904), Ho. 
11. 
3. Ibid.,  Ho. 2 (1904), Eos. 14, 25, 42. 
4. China, Ho., 2 (1904) ,  Ho. 28. 
5. U. S. House Doc. 57th Cong., (For. Rel. 1903), 
Vol. I ,  pp. 271-72. 
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agreeinent in January 1902, which aimed to secure 
the industrial development of Manchuria for the 
Russo-Chinese bahk.~ England, Japan and the Unit-
ed States protested against the Russian demands. 
Secretary Hay and Count Lamsdorff argued the ques­
t ion at issue, but the latter expressed himself as 
believing in the justice of the Russian att itude, 
and indicated that his government would maintain 
i ts right. A l it t le later,  however, Russia 
changed her mind and decided to accept the counter 
proposals of the Chinese Government--on 8 April 
1902—which provided for the gradual evacuation 
of the whole of Manchuria within eighteen months 
from the date of the agreement. This change in-
Russian policy 7/as doubtless due to the formation 
of the alliance between Great Britain and Japan. 
1. U. S. House Doc. 57th Cong., (Eor .  Rel. 1905), 
Vol. I ,  pp. 273-74. 
2. Asahawa, pp. 193-94. 
3. U. S. House Doc. 57th Cong., (Eor. Rel. 1903), 
Vol-. I ,  pp. 275-76, 926-29. 
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TMs alliance, however, did not step hostilit ies 
"between Great Britain and Japan on the one side, 
and Russia on the other. It  was merely a matter 
of fear on the part of Russia that induced her to 
accept the Chinese arrangement, and the traditional 
hatred "between these powers was intensified rather 
than checxed. 
The facts and immediate circumstances 
which led to the formation of the agreement "be- ,  
tween Great Eritain and Japan may, perhaps, "be 
"best expressed in xhe words of the negotiators 
themselves. Going "back to the circumstances im­
mediately following the revision of the Shimonoseki 
treaty in 1895, Count Hayashi sums up the situa­
tion as follows: 
"If,  however, the continental powers 
are going to continue the Alliance against her in 
order to curb our just aspirations, to fulfi1•which 
we have poured out l ife and money, then we too 
must endeavour to ourselves make an alliance' which 
shall counteract the!machinations. 
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"The recent change of Ministry in England 
seems l ikely to lead to a still  further anti-Rus­
sian feeling in that country- -  - -
"Affairs in the Ear East are now only 
in a preliminary stage. Russia certainly intends 
to obtain a predominating position, and in that 
case England's position in China might well become 
precarious. In this country all  are agreed that 
the question must finally be settled by the sword, 
but England is not in a good strategical position 
for such a course, for the struggle would be set­
tled on land and not. on sea. 
"If,  however, England and Japan should 
malce an all iance the problems of the Ear East 
would be already settled. If the events of the 
late War h ave proved to the English statesmen that 
China is merely a big idol, then they may in time 
come to realise that Japan, though she is young 
and inexperienced, is earnest and energetic. 
China is no longer the power of the Ear East,  nor 
is Japan yet i t .  Russia is trying to be i t .  But 
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the real po?/er in the Far East is England. If she 
casts her lot in with Russia she can no longer 
"be i t ,  for Russia can coerce China "by l and, v/hich 
England cannot oppose. But if  England casts in 
her lot with Japan, then she 7/ill  more than ever 
he the power of the Far East,  for she is the de­
ciding factor at present. England and Japan to­
gether can control China and insure the maintenance 
of peace in the Orient.n i-
In his Secret Memoirs, writing on the 
subject,  "The Origin of An Opinion for an Anglo-
Japanese Alliance," the Count says: "The origin of 
the desire for an all iance to "be concluded betv/een 
Great Britain and Japan is to be traced to the 
feeling existent in political circles in the lat­
ter country after the close of the Chino-Japanese 
war, 7/hen the intervention of the powers, Russia, 
France and Germany, necessitated the retrocession 
of port Arthur-
1. Hayashi, pp. 113-114--From the Jiji  Shimpo, 
June and July, 1895. 
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"Of course i t  7/as quite clear that in­
tervention from the side of Russia -would mean an 
excellent opportunity for that country to extend 
her influence in the Ear East,  and i t  7 /as very 
natural that she was at the "bottom of the 7 /hole 
affair- -  -  -
The letter of Lord Lansdovme, written 
on 30 January 1S02, to Sir Claude MacDonald, the 
British Minister at Tokio, is also of great value 
in setting forth the immediate circumstances sur­
rounding the conclusion of this Alliance, And its 
importance in this respect justifies the incorpora­
tion of the entire letter at this point in this 
thesis. The letter is as foil077s :  
"Foreign Office, January 30, 1902. 
"Sir Claude MacDonald: 
"I have signed' to-day, v/ith the Japanese 
Minister,  an Agreement "betv/een Great Britain and 
1. Hayashi, pp. 77, 80. 
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Japan, of wliich a copy is inclosed in this dis­
patch. 
"This Agreement may "be regarded as the 
outcome of the events 7/hich have taken place dur­
ing the past tv/o years in the Ear East ,  and of the 
part taken "by Great Britain and Japan in dealing 
y /i th them. 
"Throughout the troubles and complications 
v/hich arose in China consequent upon the Boxer 
outbreak and the attack upon the Peking Legations, 
the two powers have been in close and uninterrupted 
communication, and have been actuated by similar 
vi ews. 
"We have each of us desired that the in­
tegrity and independence of the Chinese Empire 
should be preserved, that there should be no dis­
turbance of the territorial status quo either in 
China or in the adjoining regions, that all  na­
tions should, within those regions, as well as 
y/ ithin the limits of the Chinese Empire, be af­
forded equal opportunities for the development of 
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t l ieir commerce and industry, and that peace should 
not only he restored, hut should, for the future, 
he maintained. 
"Eran the frequent exchanges of view 
which have taken place between the two Governments, 
and from the discovery that their Far Eastern 
policy was identical,  i t  has resulted that each 
side has expressed the desire that their common 
policy should find expression in an international 
c on tract of binding validity. 
"We have thought i t  desirable to record 
in the preamble of that instrument the main ob­
jects of our common p olicy in the Ear East to 
7/hich I  have already referred and in the first 
article we join in entirely disclaiming any ag­
gressive tendencies either in China or Korea. We 
havq however, thought i t  necessary to place on re­
cord the view entertained by both the High Con­
tracting Parties, that should their interests as 
above described be endangered, i t  will be admissi­
ble for either of them to take such measures as 
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inay "b e indispensable in order to safeguard their 
interests, and words have been added which will 
render i t  clear that such precautionary measures 
mi gilt  become necessary and might be legitimately 
taken, not only in the case of aggressive action 
or of an actual attack of some other Power, but in 
the event of disturbances arising of a character 
to necessitate the intervention of either of the 
High Contracting Parties for the protection of the 
lives and property of i ts subjects. 
"The principal obligations undertaken 
mutually by the High Contracting Parties are those 
of maintaining a strict neutrality in the event of 
either of them becoming involved in war, and of 
coming to one another's assistance in the event 
of either of them being confronted by the opposi­
t ion of more than one hostile pov/er• Under the 
remaining provisions of the Agreement, the High 
Contracting Parties undertake that neither of them 
will,  without consultation with the other, enter 
into separate arrangements with another Power 
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to the prejudice of the interests described in the 
Agreement, and that v/henever those interests are 
in jeopardy, they will communicate with one an­
other fully and frankly. 
"The concluding article has reference to 
the duration of the Agreement 7/hich, after five 
years, is terminable by either of the High Con­
tracting Parties at '  one year's notice. 
"His Majesty's Government had been large­
ly influenced in their decision to enter into this 
important contract by the conviction that i t  con­
tains no provisions v/hich can be regarded as an 
indication of aggressive or self-seeking tendencies 
in the regions to which i t  applies. It  has been 
concluded purely as a measure of precaution, to 
be invoked, should occasion arise, in the defence 
of important British interests. I t  in no way 
threatens the present position or the legitimate 
interests of other Powers. On the contrary, that 
part of i t  which renders either of the High. Con­
tracting Parties l iable to be called upon by the 
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other for assistance can operate only when one of 
the allies has found himself obliged to go to war 
in defence of interests which are common t o both, 
7/hen the circumstances in which he has taken this 
step are such as to establish that the quarrel has 
not been of his own seeking, and 7/hen, being en­
gaged in his OYm defence, he finds himself threat­
ened, not only by a single P07/er, but by a hostile 
coalition. 
"His Majesty's Government trust that the 
Agreement may be found of mutual advantage to the 
tv/o countries, that i t  7/ill  make for the pre­
servation of peace, and that,  should peace be un­
fortunately broken, i t  7/ill  have the effect of 
restricting the area of hostil it ies. 
"I am, etc.,  
Lansdowne"1  
1. Parliamentary papers, Japan, Ho. 1 (1902) .  
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The Japanese ninister for foreign Af­
fairs very convincingly pointed out the vital 
facts and important circumstances which culminat­
ed finally in the making ox this agreement, in a 
•speech 7/hich he made in February 1902. He said: 
"The Imperial Government in view of the 
actual situation in the Far East and the interests 
of the Empire involved the rein, and recognizing 
the desirability of establishing close and confi­
dential relations with friendly powers having in­
terests common v /ith them, has entered upon friend­
ly negotiations 7/ ith the Brit ish Government with 
a vie?/ to attaining the desired end. And the in­
terests of the two Governments having happily been 
brought into complete accord as the result of ex­
tended negotiations, the Imperial Government ob­
tained Imperial Sanction, and caused their 6om-
missioner to sign 7/ith the British Commissioner 
an agreement in London on 30th January last.  
The text of the agreement I have the honor to 
read before the House. The effect of the present 
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agreement as you may have seen, is entirely pa­
cific and is designed to safeguard our rights 
and interests in the t770 neighbouring Empires of 
China, a nd Korea,,  Considering that the principle 
of territorial integrity of, and the open door in, 
are no ather than vhat has been approved and 
voluntarily declared by all  of the powers concerned, 
i t  is our belief the present agreement v/ill  not 
be regarded in an unfavorable light by any of the 
POT/ers."-3-
Theje statesmen, in thus pointing out 
the recent policies of Great Britain and Japan, 
have given us a full and complete summary of the 
facts, conditions, circumstances and motives v/hi ch 
clearly indicate the immediate causes that dic­
tated the combination of these ,tv70 powers in the 
Ear East.  
1. The Japanese weekly nail ,  Vol. XXXV11, pp. 166. 
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II 
THE A NALYSIS OP T HE TREATY 
Coming no it to the Treaty as i t  7/as signed 
on 50 January 1902, i t  is necessary to analyze i t ,  
the purpose of v/hich is to ascertain the relation 
that the Document "bears to the revelation of the 
causes which led to i ts formation. Eor the pur­
pose of clarifying the stipulations of the Agree­
ment in this respect,  the Treaty is divided into 
two sections—the preamble and the articles of 
agreement—and an outline submitted v/ith each 
section. 
SECT I OH I  
The Preamble 
The Contracting Parties Propose: 
1. To maintain the Status Quo and peace of 
the Ear East 
2. To maintain the independence and territori­
al integrity of China and Korea 
1. Eor the text of the Treaty, see Blue Booh, Trea­
ty Series, Ho. 3 (1902). 
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3. To secure equal canniercial and industrial 
privileges in these countries for all  na­
tions 
In this preamble, the Contracting Par­
t ies have aimed to set forth the motives that 
suggested the formation of the Alliance pL  but 
these cannot be found here, for the roots of the 
p 
Agreement reach much further back into the past." 
The preamble merely points out the intentions of 
the t?/o powers to attain certain ends. In connec­
tion ;vith these objects, as indicated in the three 
clauses of the preamble, two important questions 
are at once apparent. In the first place, ?/hat is 
meant by the phrases "Status Quo" and "Territorial 
integrity?" Secondly, why had Great Britain and 
Japan come to vie?/ the maintenance of the Status 
Quo of China and Korea and the peace of the Par 
East,  the Territorial Integrity of China and 
1. Annual Register,  1902, p. 384. 
2. Asakav/a, pp. 197-198. 
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Korea, the commercial and industrial security of 
all  nations, with such profound consideration? It  
is unfortunate that the first of these questions 
is not ansr/ered by the terms of the Treaty i tself.  
It  would seein, however, that the accepted meaning 
of the first phrase should be plain enough and 
that,  as i t  stands in the Treaty, i t  7/ould refer 
to the situation on the date of signature," but 
Japanese statesmen, i t  appears, have considered 
i t  as applying to the Status Quo A nte Bellum—that 
is,  to the conditions as they existed before the 
Chino-Japanese VIar of 1894-1895, in which case, 
i t  would have cancelled all  Russia's aggressive 
activities in China since that time—otherwise, 
i t  7/ould seem to sanction the abnormal conditions 
hitherto unrecognized by Japan.*"'  The Japanese 
hold that all  regularly arranged conventions be­
tween China and the pov/ers are included in. the 
1. The Contemporary Revie?/,  Vol. 81, pp. 443-44. 
2. Ibid. 
phrase "Status Quo," and are, therefore, recognized 
under the Treaty. These include the Chinese 
leases as well as the commercial and industrial 
arrangements; "but i t  appears that,  "by this inter­
pretation, Japan was determined to refuse recog­
nition of all  secret and irregularly obtained con­
ventions in regard to China, end this is especially 
true in the case of the Russo-Chinese convention 
of November 190u.- L  This convention proposed to 
restore the civil government to China in .the south­
ern province of ilanchuria provided the Chinese 
soldiers were disarmed and disbanded, all  muni­
t ions, of 7/ar handed over to Russia, all  Chinese 
forts dismantled; and i t  proposed, moreover, that 
Russia would" restore aiu-chwang and other places 
then occupied by the Russians, to the Chinese au­
thorities, when the Russian government should be 
satisfied that pacification of the provinces was 
complete. I t  made further provisions for policing 
1. Blue Booh, China, Ho. 2 (1904), p. 3. 
the country v/hich should "be under the influence 
of the Russian political resident stationed at 
Mukden/* This v/as indeed an obnoxious instrument 
to the Japanese, and they had no idea of recog­
nising it  or any other convention that would 
strengthen Russian political interests in any 
part of China or Korea. And t he protest that 
was offered to China "by Japan, Great Britain, 
p 
Germany and the United States/" marks clearly the 
attitude that was being assumed by the other 
great pov/ers in regard to Russia's agressive ac­
t ivities in the Bar East .  The two negotiating 
pov/ers, nevertheless, proposed in the Treaty to 
protect the industrial and commercial interests 
of Russians well as those of all  other powers; 
and while i t  seemed that the Agreement v/as aimed 
directly at Russia,3  the latter expressed herself 
1. The London Times, 3 January, 1901, p. 3. 
Blue Book, Ch'ina, Bo .  2 (19 04), Hos. 8, 12, 13, 
19. 
3. The Living Age, March 1902, Vol. 232, pp. 697-99 
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as "being much obliged to any powers that were able 
to make any agreement which would grant a greater 
measure of security to her interests in the Par 
East--and in a joint note v/ith Prance, she ex­
pressed her appreciation of the Agreement on 16 
March 1902.1  But if  the negotiators did not mean 
the Status Quo ,  but the Status Quo A nte Bell urn o r 
the Status Quo minus secret conventions, i t  is 
much to be regretted that they did not say so, for 
in that case they would seem to stand convicted of 
having meant one thing, while saying another alto­
gether different thing. 
In seeking an answer to the second ques­
tion, i t  must be remembered that Great Britain had 
long feared Russia1  s Par Eastern policy, which ;vas 
primarily political and strategic P" Russia was 
chiefly interested in the expansion of her empire 
and this fact had led Great Britain to watch close 
1. Blue Book, China, IIo. 2 (1904), Ho. 50. 
2. Asakawa, p. 48. 
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ly her movements in the extreme East.  In the 
scramble of the po?/ers for concessions and "spheres 
of influence" in China, England had seen her 
enormous trading interests threatened, and h.ad 
considered i t  of vital importance to join in the 
scramble; she, therefore, took over a part of the 
spoils1  and "began to restore her commercial in­
fluence. 
p 
England ?/as hostile to Eranceand, as 
3  Bismarck had admitted, (jermany v/as h er rival."** 
Japan had received a great "blow from England's 
three enemies through the revision of the Shimono-
seki Treaty,1  and since that event, her diplomatic 
experience had "been extremely humiliating; On 
this occasion, she had lost the most valuable 
1..  The ITorth Americano Review, Hay 1902, Vol. 174, 
p. 599. 
2. Liurray, p. 53. 
3. Seymour, p. 134,--Rote. 
4. Hayashi ,  pp. 79 -ff.  
-69-
fruits of her victory over China. She had "been 
elbowed out from the mainland; and, 7 /hen'she was 
forced to make the compromise of 8 ITovember 1895,** 
Japan realized more strongly than ever that her 
influence was>  w aning in the Korean peninsula. In 
the midst of such experiences and in the face of 
such facts, i t  "became increasingly clear that 
Japan and Great Britain could neither uphold their 
policies nor safeguard their respective interests 
in the Par East without adopting some plan of co­
operation and joint action. Japan was looking 
for a friend, an ally, a financial backer in her 
coming stru gle 7/ith Russia--for Count Hayashi 
argued that,  "in this country all  are agreed that 
the question must finally be settles by the s7 /ord" 
-  -  -  .. -"if England and Japan should make an 
alii  nee , the problems of the Par East would be 
already settled."'- '  And E ngland was seeking some 
I .  T. Ayenaga: Review of Reviev/s, April 1902, 
Vol. 25, p, 459 .  
2 .  Hayashi ,  p .  114 .  
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soine way "by whi ch she might retrieve her diminished 
influence in the Par East.  Each nation needed the 
help of the other in vi ew of their converging in­
terests; and the very identity of these interests 
had led the contracting parties to realize more 
and more the importance of acting together. Count 
Hayashi considered their respective policies tra­
ditionally identical,  as may "b e seen from the 
following statement: "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
is the established policy or Japan. It  is the 
"basis of the country's foreign policy. It  7/as 
concluded owing to the common interests of the t?/o 
countries demanding' i t ,  a demand supported "by the 
traditional relations of the two countries. The 
Alliance may, therefore, "be regarded as resting on 
the most solid foundation. Every effort and every 
mischievous trick having for its object the split­
ting of the tie cementing the two countries must 
end in failure."-1  Dr. Asakaw/a asserts that "each 
1. Hayashi ,  p .  CO 7 .  
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of the 1770 n ations found in the other something of 
a counterpart of i ts geographical position, i ts 
mutual needs and aspirations- -  - -  -This mutual 
sympathy 17as largely intensified hy the common 
principles under 7/hich these interests could "be 
"best protected."1  In other words, the alliance 
7/as necessary to "both nations in order to protect 
2 these identical interests," and this fact ansv/ers 
the question in regard to the anxiety of Great 
Br it  p .  in and Japan for maintaining the Status Q,uo ,  
the independence and territorial integrity of 
China and Korea, as well as the commercial and in­
dustrial interests of all  nations. 
SECTION II 
The Articles of Agreement 
The Contracting Parties Agree: 
Article I .  
1. That they recognise the independence of 
China and Korea. 
1. Asakawa, pp. 201-202. 
2. Iyenaga: Review of Reviev/s, April 1902, Vol. 25, 
p .  460 .  
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2. That they are uninfluenced "by aggressive 
tendencies in either country. • 
3 .  That they have only their special interests 
in view--those of England relating to 
China; those of Japan to both China and 
Korea, with an additional polit ical in­
terest in the latter.  
4. That they will protect these interests 
from both internal and external aggressions 
by whatever means may be necessary. 
Article II.  
1. That they will assist each other in case 
of war for the defence of these interests, 
(1); By a strict neutrality on the part 
of the power not at war. 
(2) By the efforts of the latter power 
to prevent otner powers from joining 
in hostilit ies against i ts ally. 
Article III.  
That, if  any other power or powers shall 
join in hostil it ies against either of the 
ailies--at 7/ar for the defence of these in­
terests—the other High Contracting Party 
will come to i ts assistance. 
That, in such event, the t?/o allies will 




i .  That neither will enter separate arrange­
ments with other powers, to the prejudice 
of these special interests, without first 
consulting the other contracting party. 
Article V .  
1. That, on considering these interests in 
jeopardy, the two governments will  com­
municate with each other fully and frankly. 
Article VI. 
1. That the alliance shall "become effective 
immediately after the date of signature. 
2. That it  shall remain in force for a period 
of five years .  
3. That one y ear 's notice, "before the expira­
tion of the said five years, is required 
before either of the allies may terminate 
the agreement — otherwise, it  shall remain 
in force for one year from the date on 
which either of the allies shall have de­
nounced i t .  
4. That, if  either party should be actually 
at war on the date of expiration, the Al­
liance shall ,  ipso facto, continue until  
peace is concluded. 
The first clause in article I ,  specifies 
that the two allies have recognized the independence 
of China and Korea which, according to the preamble, 
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1 ° 
is one of the chief aims of the Alliance." ~ But 
in this connection, the attitude of nonest inves­
tigation leads to the inquiry as to just what the 
1770 po7/er s meant "by the term "independence" v/hen 
applied to China and Korea* This word, as common­
ly understood, would seem perfectly clear and def­
inite in its use, "but in this particular case, its 
ambiguity is,  neverthelese , apparent. The people 
of this country—during the Revolutionary period--
construed the word to apply to the full control of 
all  social,  economic, commercial,  industrial and 
governmental administration. I t  was largely the 
spirit  of social,  religious and political freedom 
that led the Pilgrim Fathers to settle in this 
country. And when Great Britain, in later years, 
tried to restrict the industrial development and 
commercial progress of these colonies, or when she 
1. For each clause, direct reference is made to 
the text of the Treaty as found in the British 
parliamentary Blue Book, Treaty Series Ho. 3, 
(1902) .  
2. Blue Book, Japan, Ho. 1 (1902). 
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atternptei to enforce laws that conflicted with 
their common, id ea of freedom and independence, 
these colonies rose in rebellion, and the mother 
country paid for her misdoing 7/ith the loss of the 
coloni es--who protested that the principles of 
their i  .dependence had been violated. In the war 
of 1812, interference on the part of France and 
Great Britain with the shipping and commercial in­
terests of the United States, was considered a 
violation of the principles of national independence 
and, therefore, a casus belli.  It  is a fact,  
moreover, that all  the great Dominions of the 
British Empire possess absolute independence—so 
far as their local affairs are concerned; and the 
British Government, with all  its traditional the­
ory and constitutional right to legislate for all  
parts of the Empire, would not even think of making 
arrangements for special interests in one of these 
independent dominions—beyond the general interests 
of the Empire as a whole. If she did, i t  would 
result in another revolution, and another independ­
ent state added to the family of nations. 
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Thus, if  the component parts of the 
British Empire itself,  interpret the "word " inde­
pendence" to mean the full control of all  matters 
within their respective territories, when applied 
to themselves and other great nations, That does 
i t  mean as used in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty with 
reference to China and Korea? If the two powers 
meant to construe the term in the light of the 
meaning indicated above, then i t  would become 
necessary in the outset for each to withdraw i ts 
claim to special interests in both China and Korea. 
Great Britain claims both commercial and indus­
trial interests in China; Japan adds a polit ical 
interest to her claim in Korea; and to withdraw 
such claims would, therefore, incur a great loss 
to each of the contracting powers; for this reason, 
they felt  that such withdrawal could not be con­
sidered. Hence, the term "independence" as used 
in this Treaty, is a misnomer and cannot be applied 
in the fullness of i ts meaning; but,  just as the 
framers of the Alliance misused the phrase "Status 
quo" in the preamble, so have they misapplied the 
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Treaty on 12 August 1905, the tv/o p owers lid not 
apply the phrase to Korea .x  
In the next clause of this article, the 
two negotiators express- themselves as entirely 
uninfluenced "by a ggressive tendencies in either 
country.2  In looking for the influence that did 
move them to action, i t  is at once clear that 
fear of Russian agression in both China and Korea 
v/as one of the strongest that pointed to xhe 
necessity of such an all iance But at this point,  
the most important question is: What did the con­
tracting parties mean "by t he phrase "aggressive 
tendencies?" Lord Lansdowne undertakes to rein­
force the provision of the clause when he says: 
"His majesty's Government had been largely in­
fluenced in their decision to enter into the im-
1. The London Times (Y/eelclyJ 29 September, 1905, 
p. 613. 
2. See Lansdowne's dispatch and letter in the Blue 
Book, Japan, llo. 1 11902). 
3. Ibid.,  China, i!o. 1 (1898), Ho. 133. 
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portant contract by the conviction that i t  con­
tains no provisions whi ch can be regarded as an in­
dication of aggressive or self-seeking tendencies 
in the regions to whi ch i t  applies.""1* But ' the ac­
tivities of Japan in Korea since the Treaty• v/as 
made has caused this statement to appear somewhat 
contradictory, especially when the treaty with 
Korea on 22 August 1910, is given due considera­
tion #  it  has been pointed out above that the 
special interests of Great Britain and Japan 7/ere 
in direct violation of the principles of independ­
ence according to the common a cceptation of the 
term; and, at this point,  consideration of the 
next clause, which sets forth Japan1  s claim to 
polit ical interests in Korea, naturally enters. 
In this clause, both parties claim to have only 
their special interests in vie?/; but i t  must be 
1. Blue Book, Japan, Ho. 1. (1902). 
2. pc,: the'proclamati on and the treaty^ of annex-, 
at ion, see the London Times (V/eekly) 2 Septem­
ber  1910, p. 667. 
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r em em bored that one of Japan's interests in Korea 
is political.  Ado this fact gives rise to the 
question: What is meant "by Japan's political in­
terest in Korea? The answer to this question 
will also solve the problem connect fid with-the 
meaning of the phrase "aggressive tendencies." 
As applied to Russia's interests in Manchuria, the 
phrase "political interests" has "been construed 
as conterminous with her acts of aggression for 
1 T her own glory as a great expanding expire. Is 
i t  not natural that the same meaning should he 
applied in the case of Japan's political interests 
in Korea? Japan had her political interests in 
China at the close of the Chino-Japanese war in 
1895, for she forced China to sign the treaty of 
Shimonoseki, which ceded to her the Liao-tung 
peninsula, Formasa, and the Pescadores Islands. 
This fact,  act would seem, demonstrates clearly 
the Japanese understanding of the phrase "politi­
cal interests." And when Russia advised the 
1. Asakawa, p. 48. 
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Japanese gov eminent "to renounce the definitive 
possession of the Liao-tung peninsula,"-- she 
called down u pon herself that hatred of the Thole 
Japanese nation which was "bound to result in 7/ar 
sooner or later.  It  was this feeling tov/ard 
Russia that led Count Hayashi to warn his country­
men that they must "be ready to carry on "both w ar­
like and peaceful measures at all  times for the 
assertion of Japanese rights; he, therefore, urged 
them to prepare to face difficulties, and to make 
great sacrifices for Japanese honor and posterity.2 
Thus v/ould the Count avenge Japan of the wrong—as 
he considered it--done her by the act of taking 
over, as Russia actually did, "what had been Japa­
nese political interests in China; and following 
up the treaties made between Japan and Korea— 
which were, in reality forced upon the latter by 
1. Hayashi , p.  85. Also see the London Times, 3 
May 1 895, p. 5. 
2 .  Ilayashi ,  p .  109 .  
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Japan--the intentions of Japan seem clear enough, 
especially, as indicate! above, in consideration 
of what did actually come to pass on 22 August 
1910 This act of annexation, which 7/as formally 
declared on 29 August, answers in full ,  the ques­
tion as to what was meant by the "political in­
terests" of Japan in Korea. In consideration of 
this explanation, i t  is also easy enough to place 
an accurate interpretation upon the term "aggressive 
tendencies" as used in the Treaty. Thus, if  the 
latter phrase is construed in the light of i ts 
common use, the contradiction of meanings in the 
first and second clauses, of article I,  is veiy 
apparent; for one of these clauses declares the 
contracting parties to be entirely uninfluenced by 
"aggressive tendencies," while the other admits 
Japan's Korean "polit ical interests"--which are, 
according to the interpretation above, spnonomous 
with the phrase "aggressive tendencies." 
1. See Henry Chung's "Korean Treaties," pp. 205-
225. Also, Hornbeclc, Appendix vll ,  pp. 441-444, 
extracts from the treaties referred to. 
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In the last c _ause of art icle I,  the 
contracting parties declare that they v/ill  pro­
tect their special interests "by a ny means that 
they may consider necessary; and adding to this 
declaration articles II and III,  the agreement "be­
gins to take shape as a defensive alliance; for 
article 11 specifies that the all ies 7 /ill  assist 
each other in case of war for the defence of 
these special interests, agreeing further that,  
if  one should be drawn into war on account of the 
said special interests; the other 7/ould not only 
maintain a strict neutrality but 7/ould use i ts 
efforts to prevent other powers from joining in 
hostil ities against i ts ally. Such an arrangement, 
however, 7 /ould be of l i tt le material value to the 
negotiating powers if i t  stepped at this point.  
But article III adds, in the first clause that,  if  
any other power or powers should join in hostilities 
against either of the allies, according to the 
arrangement of article II,  the other ally v/ould 
come to its assistance. Thus, considering the 
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last clause of article I ,  together with articles 
II and III,  i t  "becomes apparent that the negoti­
ators intended to form an all iance that "would com­
prehend the completeness of a defensive all iance; 
and "when, in this "way, the full significance of 
the treaty is ascertained, i t  is going to appear 
as a sort of -warning to those powers that have 
been engaged in the great scramble for the parti­
tion of China,1-
In the fourth article, the two powers 
agree not to make separate arrangements with other 
powers to the prejudice of their respective in­
terests without first having consulted each other. 
The significance of this provision is simple and 
may be considered as consisting of a further 
mutual guarantee of the objects aimed at in the 
Treaty--that is,  the cooperation oaf the two govern­
ments in the defence of the said special interests 
1. The London Times, 18 January 1898, p. 6. See 
also, blue Book, China, i .o. 1 (1898") Uos. 
55, 133. 
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within the regions: over which the agreement assumes 
responsibility. The fifth article is also rela­
tively unimportant. I t  provides for a full and 
frank communication between the governments of 
the contracting parties in case either should con­
sider their special interests in jeopardy—with a 
vie ;;,  of course, to taking the necessary measures 
of protection in accordance with the provision of 
the last clause of art icle I.  
There are four clauses in the sixth and 
last article of the Treaty, and the first provides 
that the Alliance shall become effective immediate­
ly after the date of signature. The significance 
of this clause is to be found in the fact that i t  
bears evidence of the readiness with which the 
treaty was accepted by both countries after the 
agreement had been reached. Count Hayashi records 
his extended efforts at negotiation, the anxiety 
which he felt  for the cause and the patience with 
which he labored to bring about the agreement, in 
his Secret Memoirs. He says:: "During the whole 
of say residence in Peking, and later in St.  
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petersburg, having the object of creating the al­
liance always in view, I  tried continuously to 
cultivate lie society of the British representa­
tives at those places- -  -  -  - .  
"In 1899 I returned to Tokio from St.  
Pet7/rsburg and visited Count I to- -  -  -  -Count 
Inouye was present at the intervi e w, and asked me 
if  I would l ike to go to London as minister.  To 
this inquiry I replied that such was my mo st ear­
nest desire. 
"Count Inouye then continued by saying 
that II.  Kato 7/as always pressing on the Poreign 
Office the urgent necessity of an alliance with 
Great Britain, and he asked for my views on the 
matter.  I  replied that I considered the alliance 
to be most advisable and important, but pointed out 
that an all iance means something mutual, each side 
bringing something into the bargain. If Japan 
were not able to bring sufficient into the alliance 
as her contribution, then in feed i t  might suit 




Russia, which country could certainly offer more 
than Japan. And even if  matters did not go so 
far as an Anglo-Russian Alliance, i t  might well 
be that the idea of an Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
would be blocked. I said that my experience in 
Russia had been that England was very popular with 
certain sections, and therefore i t  would be very 
difficult to bring about an Anglo-Japanese Al­
liance-
Count Hayashi took up his duties as 
o 
Minister at Lcnidon in 1900, and on 31 July, he 
had a conference with Lord Lansdowne during which 
the latter informed him that Great Britain considered 
i t  time to discuss seriously the question of making 
a permanent treaty with Japan. In this conversa­
tion, Lansdowne also informed the Count "that the 
situation between Japan and Korea was very similar 
1. See Hayashi'  s  Memoirs, pp. 88-9 0..  
2.  Ibid.,  p. 116. 
3. Ibid. ,  p. 129. 
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to that which had obtained "between Great Britain and 
the Transvaal," and that the Count's "views were a 
suitable basis for discussion, snd he v/ould refer 
them to Lord Salisbury with a view to negotiations 
for a 3efinite agreement being cammenced.""** 
Hay a shi immediately telegraphed the substance of 
this conference to the Japanese Foreign Office, and 
on 8 August he received the following telegram in 
reply: 
"Japanese Government acknowledges the pur­
port of the propositions made by England regarding 
a definite agreement and accepts, in toto, your 
reports of your conversations with Lord Lansdowne. 
It  desires you to proceed to obtain full particu­
lar of the British att itude in this matter.  Suc­
cess or failure of this convention depends on your 
carefulness. When our policy is fully decided 
upon the work will be easy."*c  On recejpt of this 
1. Hayashi , p.  131. 
2. Hayashi, p. 131-132. 
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telegram, the Count says: "Of course I felt  de­
lighted Y/hen I  received this telegram. Indeed, 
I.had never felt  happier in my 1 i f e ."2  
Thus the Count, now f earing, now h oping, 
yet faithfully, patiently and per si  stently pursued 
his course and urged his cause, at the British 
Court,  v/ith great anxiety, until  his object 7/as 
fully realized in the final consummati on of the 
longed-for Treaty on 30 January 1902 .2  
But British statesmen v/ere equally in­
terested in the conclusion of this all iance as may 
be seen from various assertions made in the ear­
l ier stages of the negotiations, as well as after 
the treaty had been made. In conversation 7/ith 
Sir Claude LlacDonald, Count Hayashi reports him ap 
having said: "Whilst we a re wasting time in dis­
cussing the terms of an agreement 7/ith Japan , the 
1. Hayashi , p.  132. 
2. Ibid.,  p. 167. A very splendid f  detailed ac­
count of these negotiations is given in Hayashi '  s 
iiemoirs, pp. 119-199. 
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Japanese Government might take up the i  dea of mak­
ing an alliance with Russia. In fact,  the German 
.Ambassador (? Charg£) has been to the Foreign Of­
fice and said that there was a possibility of such 
action on the side of Japan."1  The Count also as­
serts that Lord Lansdov/ne expressed his views in 
the following statement: "We think that the time 
has come to discuss seriously the suestion of mrkirg 
a permanent treaty with Japan. I  v/ant therefore, 
to ask you what is the view of the Japanese Govern­
ment with regard to the relationship of interna-
tional interests in Manchuria, and secondly what 
sort of treaty you would want to make with us 
After learning the views of the count, Lansdotme 
continue a: "As regards Korea, England has very 
l i t tle interest in that country, but she does not 
7/i sh to see Korea fall  into the hands of Russia .  
1. Hayashi , p.  128 .  
2. Ibid.,  pp. 129-130 .  
3. Ibid..  
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In the Lansdowno letter of 30 January 
1902, after the Alii once had "been made, the writer 
endeavoured to point out the purpose of the agree­
ment and expressed himself as "believing that i t  
would "bring great advantage to "both contracting 
parties, and at the same time make for keeping the 
peace of the Far East .  In thi s respect,  he says: 
"Bis Majesty1  s Government trust that the agreement 
may be found of mutual advantage to the t;vo coun­
tries, that i t  will make for the preservation of 
peace, and that,  should peace be unfortunately 
broken, i t  will have the effect of restricting the 
area of hostil ities."1  The opinions of these 
st tesmen thus expressed, point certainly to the 
fact that both Japan and Great Britain were glad to 
accept this treaty-arrangement. 
The second clause of this sixth article 
provides that the Agreement shall remain in force 
1. See the Lansdowne Letter,  whi ch is given in 
full on pages 54-59 of this thesis. 
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for a period of five years--ani this has "been called 
"the 7/ isest clause in the Treaty."™ The third 
specifies that one year's notice will "be required 
after the expiration of the said five years before 
either of the all ies may terminate the Agreement. 
The fourth clause is merely an extension of the 
provisi on w hich aims to continue the Alliance in 
case either of the allies should be at war when the 
date of expiration ar rives. Lord Lansdowne alludes 
to The last article as merely having reference to 
the duration of the Agreement which, after five 
years is terminable by either of the High Contrac­
ting Parties at one year's notice." ^ 
1. The Living Age, March 1902, Vol, 232, p. 699. 
2. Lansdovme's Letter,  see Blue Boole, Japan, ITo. 1 
(1902) or preceding pages, 54-59, in this 
thesis. The letter is also given in the London 
Times, 12 February, 1902, p. 5. 
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CONCLUSION 
In finally concluding this investigation, 
the facts ascertained may "be summarized as follows: 
(1) Great Britain feared Russia, hated France, and 
considered Germany her commercial r ival; (2) Jajvan 
hated "both Russia and China, and wished to amal­
gamate Korea with herself; (3) The special interests 
of the t?;o contracting parties 71  e re  both traditional 
and identical; (4) The preamble of the Treaty sets 
forth the purpose and announces the aims of the 
Alliance; (5) The articles of agreement provide the 
arrangement by v/hi ch the allies hoped to obtain 
their common o bjects; (6) The Agreement abounds 
in misapplied phrases, contradictory terms and 
grave inconsistencies; (7) These inconsistencies 
cast abundant l ight upon the real motives of the 
negotiating p07/ers- -p oi n t  i  n g out that their special 
interests comprehended the intention to check the 
aggressive activit ies of other powers in the Far 
Last,  and to increase and extend their own imperi­
alist ic interests, as is most clearly shown by 
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Japan's annexation of Korea. And (8) out of these 
circumstances, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 7/as 
born. 
These facts represent the conditions 
7/hich induced the motives that led finally to the 
c onclusi on of thi s Alliance, and point specifical iy 
to the policies tnat had dictated the terras of the 
Treaty. In conversat ion with Count Hay as hi ,  before 
the Alliance 7/as concluded, Lord Lansdov/ne said: 
"As regards China, our policy is identical with 
Japan's namely, the maintenance of territorial in­
tegrity and the open door- -  -  - ~ 
After the Treaty was made this same 
diplomat said: "It may be regarded as the outcome 
of the events which have taken place during the 
last t 7/o years in the Par Last,  and of the part 
taken by Great Britain and Japan in dealing with 
them-
i .  Hay as hi , p.  130. 
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"From the frequent exchanges of view 
which have taken place "between the tvoo G overnments, 
and from the discovery that their Far Eastern 
policy was identical,  i t  has resulted that each 
side has expressed the desire that their common 
po 1 i cy should f in:i expressi on in an international 
contract of "binding validity. 
Count Hayashi says: "The Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance is the established policy of Japan,- -  -  -
It  was concluded owing to the common i nterests of 
the two countries demanding i t ,  a demand supported 
by the traditional relations of the two countries , 
_ - «. -M • wm wm mm  ̂
Mr. Kato, who was Foreign Minister at 
Tolcio at the time of the Boxer uprising, spoke in 
unqualified terms of the Alliance. "He says that 
the t7/o countries 7/alked in such perfect step 
during the recent complications that they were 
1. See Lansdowne's Letter given above. 
2. Hayashi, p. 207. 
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su spec ted of being already in alliance, and there 
can be no doubt that the hearts of both have been 
long tending to union- -  -  -  - .The Japanese 
Week!y Hail adds also the opinion of Count Okuma-
It  says: "Count 0lamia regards the Aliiance as a 
natural outcome of the tv/o Pov/ers'  community of 
interests and cooperation in action. They have 
been Allies in effect for some years, they are now 
2 allies in name-
Lord Lansdowne and Count Hayashi v/ere 
the chief negotiators as well as the signers of the 
uocument; Ilr.  Kato and Count Okuma w ere prominent 
Japanese statesmen, 7/ho m ust have been in close 
touch v/ith public sentiment and 7/ho were doubtless 
well informed on the subject of Japanese diplomatic 
history. Certainly the opinions of these statesmen 
can safely be taken as evidence of the tradit ional­
ly convergent policies of the tv/o negotiating powers. 
1. The Japanese Weekly H ail ,  vol. AXXVII, pp. 167-
168. 
2. Ibid.,  pp. 167-168. 
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?he Japanese Weekly Kail has given what 
appears to "be a very conclusive summary of Japanese 
public opinion through the Japanese press which 
indicates very clearly the attitude of J '  pan 
toward the conclusion of this covenant with England. 
Only such statements are given here, however, as 
tend to throw more light upon the idea of the tra­
ditionally convergent and finally identical policies 
of the two countries. 
The Kail quotes the Kokumin Shimbun as 
follows: "The 12th of February is a day to be 
remembered in Japanese Annals, since i t  saw the 
announcement of an international event of the 
highest importance- -  -  - -It  may reasonably be 
said that over since the Chinese trouble of 1900 
England and Japan have been gradually drawing to­
gether- -  -  - - .  
"The result is due not only to the ability 
and tact of Hr. Komura but also to the foresight 
of Kr. TCato, and Baron Hay as hi in London has con­
tributed his share by his capacity and adroitness- -
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- -isy whatever statesman the end was achieved, how­
ever, the fact is equally great.  Our long dream 
has "become a reality- -  -  -  -." " 
The Jij i  Shirnpo says: "As for the events 
that have led up to this issue, it  has long "been 
plain that Japan's policy was identical with that 
set forth in the Agreement, and, at the same time, 
Japan herself recognized that to carry out that 
policy single-handed might "be di ffi  cult- -  -  -  -what 
was wanted was an accasion to "bring the two, (Japan 
and England) , together and to convince the latter 
of the sincerity of Japan's purpose as well as of 
her eligibility for an Union. The Chinese Compli ca-
p 
tion furnished this opportunity." 
The H ail says: "The iTichi pichi Shimbun 
thinks that the 7; or Id had already recognized the 
practical reality and the sincerity of the Union 
of England and Japan in Ear Eastern affairs, and 




that the Japanese people themselves had recognized 
it ,  so that its consummation in the foim of a 
written agreement may now " be regarded as in the 
natural sequence of events- -  - -
"Our contemporary then analyzes the 
Agreement article "by a rt icle with strong approval, 
and concludes "by n oting that England and Japan 
have been steadily drawing together for many years. 
It  was England that set the example of revising 
the treaties, and after the war of 1894 to 1895 her 
attitude toward Japan has been uniformly fri  endly 
while the events of the Chinese crisis developed in 
practice and identity of interests, well known to 
exist in theory."^ 
The Yomiuri Shimbun says: "Ho lengthy 
exposition is needed to set forth its lofty purpose 
and absolutely sincere spirit .  Yet any one regarding 
i t  as a new polit ical departure would be much m is­
taken. i t  is nothing more than a reduction to 
1. The Japanese Weekly Hail,  Vol. XXXVII, p.  167. 
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documentary for:ii  of the facts that have asserted 
themselves In the practice f£  the two powers, 
each having abundantly proved by its actions during 
recent years that its sola aim is the preservation 
of peace and the open door."*5* 
The Japanese Hail concludes this summary 
y /i th this statement: "The Hochi Shirnbun, v/hich 
heads its article 7/itii a picture of the two cou11-
tries" crossed flags, says that the hearts of both 
nations have long inclined to this Alliance, rind 
that their acts in recent years have plainly pre­
saged it-  -  - -  -Japan has long "been in accord with 
England in her attitude toward Far Eastern problems."2  
Thus, in addition to the opinions 01 the 
tv/o statesmen v/ho made and signed this Treaty,,  and 
those of other English and Japanesd statesmen, we 
must add the opinion of the general public as ex­
pressed through the various newspapers and journals 
1. The Japanese Weekly Hail,  Vol. XXXVII, p.  167. 
2.  Ib id .  
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quoted above, all  of which must be taken as con­
clusive evi dence that the Treaty was, in reality, 
a consummate expression of the results of the 
respective foreign policies of Great Britain and 
Japan, which reach far back into the nineteenth 
century. 
m 
